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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀect of foreign presence on the productivity of manufacturing
industries in Ghana, using firm level panel data. We examine both labor and total factor
productivity (TFP), which we compute using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.
We control for a number of observed factors as well as unobserved heterogeneity in several
dimensions. We find robust evidence that the presence of foreign firms in a sector has a negative
eﬀect on domestically owned, but a positive eﬀect on most foreign owned firms. Unlike in recent
work on China, it does not appear that the negative level eﬀect is compensated for by a positive
growth eﬀect, at least not in any reasonable time period. This finding underscores that care
must be exercised in extrapolating results from one country to others. We find no evidence of
any wage eﬀects.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, many countries, particularly in the developing world, have sought to attract foreign
investment, especially in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is considered beneficial
not only because it brings in much needed capital, but generates employment and presumably con-
tributes to enhanced economic growth as it provides access to advanced technologies and spillovers,
technological or otherwise, especially in local manufacturing industries (Borensztein, De Gregorio
and Lee, 1998; De Mello, 1999). For the lowest income developing countries, the manufacturing
sector in particular is considered a driving force for modernization and job creation. However, some
skepticism remains and centers on the repatriation of profits and competition eﬀects which lead to
shrinking market shares or exit of domestic firms. Indeed, some studies such as Oteng-Abayie and
Frimpong (2006) find that FDI may have a negative impact on GDP growth.
On the microeconomic level, several studies have provided support for doubts about the eﬃcacy
of foreign presence in terms of wages or productivity. For example, Aitken and Harrison (1999), in a
seminal study of Venezuela, or Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996) for Mexico and Venezuela, have
shown negative productivity and wage eﬀects for domestic firms and only small, if any, positive
eﬀects overall. On the other hand, Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) has shown positive inter-industry
spillover eﬀects from foreign firms in Lithuania. Liu (2008) documents a negative level, but a posi-
tive growth eﬀect for China. While the literature on the eﬀects of foreign presence on productivity
and wages in developing countries is growing, the evidence is decidedly mixed and varies greatly
among countries and industries (see Blomström and Kokko, 1998). This may be particularly true
for countries in Africa, specifically sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which tend to be quite diﬀerent from
countries in Asia or Latin America in many respects (see, for example, Asiedu, 2002, for evidence
on the determinants of FDI).
In order to shed light on whether this applies to FDI’s impact on the economy as well, this paper
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investigates the eﬀect of foreign presence in manufacturing in Ghana on productivity and wages and
the possible existence of spillover eﬀects to domestic firms. We do so using recent methodological
advances that allow us to obtain a consistent estimate of total factor productivity (TFP) and
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity that avoids biased estimates due to self selection and
simultaneity. We use data from a survey of over 200 manufacturing firms in the early to mid-
1990s. Even though this dataset has been available for a while and is uniquely suited to such an
investigation, to date it has not been used for this specific purpose, to the best of our knowledge,
as we will document below in our discussion of related literature.
Policies geared towards attracting foreign direct investment presume that foreign firms have
higher productivity and that domestic firms stand to gain from the presence of foreign firms.
Ghana has had an open trade policy since the beginning of the 1990s and hence constitutes an
interesting case study within SSA. We consider the following specific questions. Are foreign firms
more productive than domestic firms? Does the presence of foreign firms in a sector have any eﬀect
on the productivity of domestic firms? Is a potentially negative level eﬀect compensated for by
a positive growth eﬀect and if so, how long will that take? Do the eﬀects depend on controls for
observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the industry, firm and regional level?
The findings of this study are interesting and relevant not only for policy decisions in Ghana
with regards to its foreign investment regime, but for SSA countries more generally as many become
more open to trade and investment flows. Examining Ghana’s experience helps shed light on what
may be expected for similar countries in the region, more so than studies of countries whose history
and characteristics are vastly diﬀerent from SSA countries. This is especially important considering
that the poorest people in the world are overwhelmingly concentrated in SSA.
We find that the presence of foreign firms in a sector has a negative eﬀect on the productivity of
domestically owned, but a positive eﬀect on most foreign owned firms, regardless of the productivity
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measure. Interestingly, the eﬀect of foreign ownership per se is ambiguous and depends on the model
specification. Unlike in recent work on China, it does not appear that the negative level eﬀect from
foreign ownership is compensated for by a positive growth eﬀect, at least not in any reasonable time
period. We also find that, after controlling for labor quality and unobserved heterogeneity, foreign
firms do not pay higher wages in Ghana. However, they also do not appear to have a negative
eﬀect on wages paid by domestic firms.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief economic history of Ghana.
We then discuss relevant theory and review the related literature, including other work using this
dataset, whose description follows. We then present the empirical methodology, which is based on
a simple theoretical model and includes a thorough description of TFP measurement. Section 6
discusses the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Brief Economic History of Ghana
Since gaining independence in 1957, Ghana has experienced a checkered history of economic un-
derperformance interspersed with periods of solid economic recovery. The first few decades after
independence were marked by political instability, economic mismanagement and poor economic
performance, whereas the last two have seen steady economic growth. Economic liberalization
in the 1980s and political liberation in the 1990s appear to be the key reasons for the improved
economic conditions in Ghana.
The period immediately following independence was marked by high GDP growth and ac-
celerated economic change (Rimmer, 1992). The economy diversified away from agriculture into
large-scale manufacturing and services. Along with these positive changes, the public sector ex-
panded in order to provide social services. However, lack of fiscal prudence led to unsustainable
foreign debt and a slowdown in economic growth, resulting in Ghana’s first coup d’etat in 1966.
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Although the change in government gave way to optimism, lack of commitment to economic reform
and further political instability set Ghana on a downward path of growth. Ghanaian companies
remained uncompetitive in international markets, due in part to discrimination against foreign
companies and an overvalued currency, the Cedi.
Ghana experienced a dramatic economic decline throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Between
1970 and 1982, GDP per capita fell by 30%, real wages by 80% and the import volume by 66%
(Rimmer, 1992). In addition, investment fell from 14% to 2 % while the government deficit rose
from 0.4% to 14.6% of GDP. Unfavorable policy making, including fiscal interference with exporting,
inflationary financing of government spending and an inflexible exchange rate take the bulk of the
blame for this abysmal performance. The oil crisis of 1975 further exacerbated an already worsening
economic situation.
The year 1983 marked a turnaround in policy. The Ghanaian government adopted the Economic
Reform Program, with support from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Reform
consisted of measures such as stabilization of fiscal balances, removal of price distortions, revised
interest rates, upward adjustment of wages, adjustment of the exchange rate and encouragement of
foreign direct investment and external trade. Following these reforms, GDP reversed its downward
trend and had an average annual rate of growth of over 5% for the rest of the 1980s. The economic
recovery experienced in the 1980s continued through the 1990s. In 2006, Ghana still had GDP
growth of 6.2 % (The World Bank, 2007). Poverty is down from 51% in 1999 to 33.4% in 2005.
According to the World Bank, Ghana could be amongst the first sub-Saharan African countries
to become middle income over the next few decades. As Ghana celebrates its 50th independence
anniversary, it is on a promising path which may in part be due to the presence of foreign investors,
whose impact we investigate below. But first, we discuss some theoretical considerations and related
literature.
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3 Theory and Related Literature
Foreign firms are presumed to have inherent advantages, particularly in scale and technological
knowledge and in access to international markets, that allow them to overcome the cost of setting
up in a diﬀerent country and to produce more eﬃciently (Hymer, 1976; Blomström and Kokko,
1997). Often, these advantages take the form of proprietary assets, technology or management
and marketing practices (what Markusen (2002) terms ‘knowledge capital’). These imply higher
productivity of foreign-owned firms themselves. Moreover, productivity spillovers may have positive
eﬀects on local firms. Productivity spillovers generally take place when the entry or presence of
multinational firms leads to eﬃciency or productivity benefits for local firms that are not fully
internalized by the foreign firm (Blomström and Kokko, 1998).
There are several mechanisms through which these spillover eﬀects occur.1 These can be split
into competition and demonstration eﬀects (Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin, 2001). The presence
of more eﬃcient foreign firms in an industry may increase competition in domestic industries as
foreign firms tend to populate industries where the initial cost of entry is high (Caves, 1974).
They may also break up domestic monopolies by lowering excess profits and generally improving
allocative eﬃciency. Local firms can also improve their productivity by copying technology from
multinational firms in their industry. Foreign firms may not be able to internalize all the gains of
their technology and domestic firms may benefit through their contact with foreign firms, either
as suppliers, consumers or competitors. The extent to which spillovers occur helps determine the
productivity eﬀect for local firms from the presence of foreign firms in the same or related industries.
Reflecting their higher marginal product of labor, foreign firms also pay higher wages. However,
it is unclear whether they positively aﬀect wage levels in the host country and in the industries that
they are present in. The higher wages in foreign-owned firms may simply reflect their selection into
1For a thorough review of the literature on the channels of spillovers see Crespo and Fontoura (2007).
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particularly high-wage sectors or regions of a country (Lipsey, 2002). Foreign firms may attract
the most able workers, leaving less skilled ones for domestic firms, with resulting lower wages.
Indirectly, the increased competition in an industry may drive domestic firms to exit, leaving the
aggregate demand for labor ambiguous.
Empirical evidence on wage and productivity eﬀects of foreign ownership span both industrial-
ized and developing countries.In a large panel study of over 30 OECD and non-OECD countries De
Mello (1999) finds that FDI has a positive eﬀect on TFP growth in OECD countries, but no or even
a negative eﬀect in non-OECD ones. He also finds that the eﬀect of FDI on capital accumulation
is nonexistent or negative in the former, but positive in the latter. Put together, these findings
lead him to conclude that in technologically laggard countries, there exists a complementarity eﬀect
between FDI and domestic investment, resulting in a reduction in TFP growth as FDI enters. For
technological leaders, on the other hand, there is a substitution eﬀect, perhaps because older capital
is made obsolete more quickly and comprehensively by the introduction of new capital via FDI.
There are a number of developing country studies. Haddad and Harrison (1993), using panel
data from Morocco, report that dispersion in productivity is smaller in sectors with more foreign
firms but they find no evidence of accelerated productivity growth amongst domestic firms. Blom-
ström and Wolﬀ (1994) investigate spillovers in Mexico from the presence of foreign firms. They find
that productivity levels of domestic companies in Mexico have converged to that of foreign-owned
firms. They also find that the rate of productivity growth of local firms increases with the share
of foreign ownership in an industry. In a seminal study of Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999)
find that positive productivity eﬀects are confined to plants with foreign equity participation, and
then only small ones, but that domestic plants are negatively aﬀected, with a very small overall
positive eﬀect. In a study of Lithuania, Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) finds evidence consistent with
spillovers from foreign aﬃliates to their local suppliers in upstream industries, although only for
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projects with shared domestic and foreign ownership, not for wholly owned foreign subsidiaries.
Liu (2008) distinguishes between a level and a growth eﬀect of foreign presence on TFP. Learning
advanced foreign technology is costly and requires that scarce resources be devoted to the eﬀort
which is why a short-term negative eﬀect on the level of TFP is expected but a long-run positive ef-
fect on the growth rate of TFP. Panel data on Chinese manufacturing firms confirms the theoretical
expectations.
In their extensive survey of the literature, Görg and Greenaway (2004) find that the evidence
on productivity and spillovers is mixed and depends largely on the study methodology and data
used. They point out that ideally, a panel of firms observed over a number of years should be used
to elicit productivity and spillover eﬀects of foreign investment and to be able to deal with self-
selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, Görg and Strobl’s (2001) meta-analysis
points out that there appears to be some publication bias, which suggests that the evidence is even
more mixed than a review of published studies suggests.
For wage eﬀects in developing countries, a seminal study of Mexico and Venezuela by Aitken,
Harrison and Lipsey (1996) finds that while foreign firms tend to pay higher wages, the aggregate
eﬀect is virtually zero. They determine that diﬀerences in capital intensity account for much of
the diﬀerence in wages between domestic and foreign firms. In his survey of the literature, Lipsey
(2002) concludes that the finding of foreign firms paying higher wages than domestic firms is fairly
robust, while the evidence on spillovers is mixed.
Overall, empirical studies generally seem to provide evidence of wage diﬀerences between for-
eign and domestic firms; however, the support for productivity diﬀerentials and productivity and
wage spillovers is quite weak, especially for developing countries. Blomström and Kokko (1998)
attempt to explain these mixed results. They enumerate the determinants of host country spillovers
from FDI. For spillovers to occur, host country characteristics such as intellectual property rights,
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competition in markets, stock of technical knowledge and the overall size of the economy have to
be conducive to the process. Domestic firms must be able to aﬀord the cost of adopting foreign
firm technology in order to be able to obtain or copy such technology. Hence the lack of these
preconditions may be the cause of weak or non-existent spillover eﬀects from foreign to domestic
firms in developing countries, particularly very poor ones such as those in SSA.
Francis Teal (1999; 2000) and coauthors (Söderbom and Teal, 2000, 2004; Söderbom, Teal and
Harding, 2006) have made extensive use of the Ghanaian survey data. However, all of these studies
address questions that are quite distinct from the ones we ask here. Teal (1999) analyzes produc-
tivity growth in Ghanaian manufacturing in general, finding large increases over the survey period,
which can be entirely explained by the growth in (physical) capital and labor inputs. Value added
regressions include only a simple ownership dummy, the coeﬃcient of which is not even reported.
Teal (2000) documents the evolution of real wages over the sample period, estimating labor share
equations. Again, a simple ownership dummy is included in regressions, but the coeﬃcient is not
reported. Söderbom and Teal (2000) analyze the eﬀect of skill on investing and the export per-
formance of firms. They run one regression with real value added per employee as the dependent
variable where they report a significantly positive coeﬃcient on the foreign ownership dummy vari-
able. Söderbom and Teal (2004) address the issue of dispersion of productivity in this sample of
firms. The only time they look at foreign owned firms is to correlate the fixed eﬀects from a produc-
tion function regression with an ownership dummy, finding that technical eﬃciency dispersion is
not diﬀerent in domestic versus foreign-owned firms. Finally, Söderbom, Teal and Harding (2006)
investigate the determinants of firm exit in Ghana as well as Kenya and Tanzania.2 Again, they
include a simple foreign ownership dummy in their regressions, finding no higher probability of exit
in foreign-owned firms.
2Frazer (2005) also investigates the determinants of firm exit, but for Ghana only. His focus is on the role of
productivity and again, only a foreign ownership dummy is included as a control. It is never statistically significant.
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Görg and Strobl (2005) use the Ghanaian data set not to study the eﬀect of foreign presence on
productivity and spillovers per se, but to investigate a very particular channel of possible spillovers.
They relate firm level productivity to the previous work experience of the owner, finding that if he
or she has previously worked at a multinational company, productivity is enhanced, although only
if the foreign firm was operating in the same sector of the economy.3 In contrast, we study the
eﬀects of foreign presence on firm productivity and wages more broadly.
In summary, while a number of studies have used the same dataset to address a variety of
questions, none of these ask precisely the same ones that we do. When similar regressions are run,
only a simple ownership dummy at the firm level is included as a control, while we analyze the
eﬀect of foreign ownership, measured as the equity share, not just as a simple dummy, at both the
firm and the sector level, their interaction as well as the role of spillovers.
4 Data
This paper makes use of a comprehensive panel dataset drawn from surveys of the Ghanaian
manufacturing sector conducted in five rounds between 1992 and 1998. It provides yearly firm
level and labor force information spanning the period 1991-1997. The first part of the data from
1991-1993 was collected as part of the World Bank’s Regional Program on Enterprise Development
(RPED). The next two rounds each cover two year periods from 1994-1997. The data for this round
was collected by a team from the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE)4, University
of Oxford, the University of Ghana, Legon, and the Ghana Statistical Oﬃce.
The first sample of firms was drawn randomly from the Census of Manufacturing Activities
conducted in 1987. The firms were categorized based on sector and location. In all there are 9
3Görg, Strobl and Walsh (2007) study foreign ownership at the firm level and individual workers’ wages, using
only the last wave of the dataset. Te Velde and Morrissey (2003) examine foreign ownership and individual wages in
five African countries, including Ghana, using only the first few waves of this dataset.
4http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/
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sectors including textiles and garments and metal works. They were also categorized by location:
Accra, Cape Coast, Kumasi and Takoradi, all of which constitute major industrial centers in Ghana.
The coverage of this dataset is quite extensive as most of the major manufacturing sectors at the
time under investigation are represented.
Over the course of data collection, 34 firms of the 200 initially surveyed exited their respective
industries. However, these were replaced with firms of similar size from the same sector and
location. Within each firm, data was collected on a random sample of up to 10 workers and
apprentices, conditional on the total number of workers available. This provides data on worker
characteristics.
The dataset has the advantage of containing a large number of firms over a long period of time
and information on many firm characteristics. It also contains pre-calculated price deflators which
allow the derivation of real output and input prices. Price indices for each year were calculated
based on the prices of each firm’s most important goods. Where the prices of a firm’s goods were
unavailable, information on prices of similar goods across firms or sectoral averages were used (Teal,
2002).
5 Empirical Methodology
Consider a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
Yit = AitKα1it L
α2
it eit (1)
where Yit is value added, Ait, Kit and Lit denote total factor productivity (TFP), capital and labor
in firm i at time t, respectively, and e is a random disturbance term.5 Note that we do not impose
5 In order to avoid notational clutter, we omit sector subscripts, but emphasize that the following calculations are
carried out separately for each sector.
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constant returns to scale. Taking natural logarithms and re-arranging slightly, we obtain
yit = α1kit + α2lit + ωit + εit (2)
where lower case letters denote log values, ωit = ln (Ait) and εit = ln (eit). We take TFP to be
influenced by the foreign presence in the firm as well as the sector, their interaction and other
factors to be made precise below. But first we need to discuss how to estimate ωit in equation (2).
The basic problem in estimating (unobserved) firm- and time-specific productivity is that decision
makers may observe it, which conditions their input choices, but the econometrician does not. If
this is the case, there is a simultaneity problem, which means that the variable inputs and ωit are
correlated and thus ordinary least squares (OLS) would produce inconsistent estimates. There are
several solutions which have been proposed. Olley and Pakes (1996) proxy for ωit by introducing
an investment function
invit = ft (ωit, kit) (3)
which, if invit is monotonically increasing in ωit, can be inverted and then substituted into the
production function (2). The problem is that this procedure requires strictly positive investment
and observations that show zero investment must be dropped. This is the case for many firms in
developing countries in particular. In the Ghanaian data set, 54 percent of usable observations
have zero investment, resulting in a large number of observations to be discarded. Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) rely on intermediate input usage instead, which is available in the Ghanaian data
where only just over one percent of observations are zero. Consider the intermediate input demand
function
mit = gt (ωit, kit) (4)
which, if mit is monotonically increasing in ωit, can be inverted to obtain
ωit = g−1t (mit, kit) . (5)
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The only additional assumption needed to proceed with the estimation of productivity is that
it follows a first-order Markov process. Substituting (5) into (2) gives
yit = α1kit + α2lit + g−1t (mit, kit) + εit (6)
which can be written as
yit = α2lit + φt (mit, kit) + εit (7)
where φt (mit, kit) = α1kit + g
−1
t (mit, kit). The function φt can be estimated with a third-order
polynomial approximation in mit and kit, and thus this first stage of the estimation yields the
estimate bα2 of α2.
Since it cannot be identified separately when estimating equation (7), the coeﬃcient on capital,
α1, is obtained in a second estimation stage, which we will sketch briefly. From (7), one computes
an estimated value bφt, which can be used to compute a prediction for ωit for any candidate value
α∗1 using bωit = bφt − α∗1kit. Using these values, a consistent approximation of the expected value of
ωit is given by the predicted values of the regression
bωit = γ0 + γ1ωit−1 + γ2ω2it−1 + γ3ω3it−1 + it. (8)
Then, the estimate bα1 of α1 is found as the solution to minimizing the sample residual of
the production function with respect to α∗1. A bootstrapping procedure is used to construct the
standard errors for bα1 and bα2. For further details, see Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). We implement
this procedure using the ‘levpet’ command in STATA, which was written by Levinsohn, Petrin and
Brian Poi (see also Petrin, Levinsohn and Poi, 2004).
Now, TFP is modeled as a function of foreign presence at the firm and sector levels and other
factors:
tfpit = β0 + β1FDI_firmit + β2FDI_sector jt + β3 (FDI_firm · FDI_sector)ijt
+β4LQit + μi/j + λt + θl + ψit (9)
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where FDI_firm is the foreign ownership share in firm i, ranging from 0 to 1, FDI_sector
is the foreign presence in sector j, LQ is labor quality, μi/j a sector (μj) or firm (μi) fixed eﬀect,
λt a time fixed eﬀect, θl a location fixed eﬀect, and ψit is an iid error. For notational convenience
and to distinguish what follows from the procedure of estimating TFP, ωit is replaced by tfpit.
FDI_sector is defined as foreign ownership shares averaged over all firms in a sector, weighted by
each firm’s output share
FDI_sector jt =
P
i
{FDI_firmijt · outputijt}P
i
outputijt
(10)
A positive coeﬃcient β1 would indicate a positive eﬀect from foreign ownership at the firm
level and β2 > 0 would indicate the existence of a spillover eﬀect from foreign to domestic firms.
The interaction term allows for a diﬀerential eﬀect of spillovers for foreign and domestic firms.
Specifically, β3 > 0 would indicate that foreign owned firms benefit from the presence of other
foreign-owned firms in the sector. In the analysis below, we also estimate (9) for domestic firms
only, thus omitting FDI_firm and the interaction term, as a robustness check.
Since TFP is estimated from a production function containing capital, labor and material inputs,
none of these are included in (9). We have, however, not accounted for diﬀerences in the quality
of labor among firms. A higher average labor quality or equivalently skill level is likely to result in
higher productivity. We use a measure that is constructed from employee-level information from
each firm. Specifically, it is the average years of schooling plus the average tenure (experience) of
workers in a firm, multiplied by the number of workers. This measure of average labor quality was
constructed by Francis Teal from the raw data and is commonly used in work with this dataset
(see Teal, 2002). A positive coeﬃcient sign on this variable is expected.
One well-known problem in productivity studies is that diﬀerences in productivity might be
correlated with foreign activity because foreign firms are attracted to sectors that already have
higher productivity. If that is the case, then failing to control for diﬀerences across industries is likely
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to find a positive correlation between FDI and productivity. A common solution to this problem is
the use of industry fixed eﬀects. However, there may additionally be unobserved heterogeneity at
the firm level. For example, higher productivity firms may be more attractive takeover targets for
foreign investors, again inducing a spurious correlation between productivity and foreign ownership.
To the extent that this heterogeneity is firm specific, but time invariant, it can be controlled for
with the inclusion of firm dummies. Below, we report both sets of results, those using industry and
those using firm dummies and we do this for two reasons. First, prior studies such as Aitken and
Harrison (1999) use industry, not firm dummies. Secondly, the drop in degrees of freedom when
using firm dummies along with the very low year variation in our foreign ownership variable makes
it diﬃcult to detect foreign ownership eﬀects in that case. In addition, we account for unobserved
year and location heterogeneity by including both year and location dummies.
Recently, Liu (2008) has hypothesized that foreign presence may have a negative level, but a
positive growth eﬀect on productivity. Benefitting from advanced technology and other forms of
assets, tangible and intangible, of foreign firms requires expenses for machinery, tools and perhaps
training in order to adapt the technology or practice. In the short run, this will lower productivity.
In the medium to long run, however, these will have positive productivity eﬀects, resulting in a
higher TFP rate of growth. Liu implements this idea by including a time trend (growth) and the
trend interacted with the measure of foreign presence in a sector. Adapting this approach to our
specification yields
tfpit = β0 + β1FDI_firmit + β2FDI_sector jt + β3 (FDI_sector · time)ijt
+γ time+ β4QLit + μi/j + θl + ψit. (11)
Note that the time trend replaces the year fixed eﬀects. If Liu’s hypothesis is correct for Ghana,
β2 < 0 and β3 > 0. Moreover, in such a case, one can compute the number of years it will take for
the positive growth eﬀect to compensate for the negative level eﬀect.
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While we hypothesize that foreign presence aﬀects total factor productivity and thus a regression
of TFP on FDI and controls is an appropriate approach, the model outlined above suggests a
complementary, indirect approach. Instead of going through the procedure of estimating TFP, we
can directly estimate the eﬀect of foreign presence on labor productivity. This approach is also
useful for comparing the results of this study to earlier ones that use only labor productivity, not
TFP.6 Consider again the standard Cobb-Douglas production function (1). Dividing it by L and
taking natural logs yields
lpit = tfpit + β5kl + β6k + ηit (12)
where lp = ln (Y/L) is log value added per worker (labor productivity), kl = ln (K/L), k = ln (K),
β5 = (1− α2), β6 = (α1 + α2 − 1) and ηit is an error term. Substituting (9) into (12) yields
lpit = β0 + β1FDI_firmit + β2FDI_sector jt + β3 (FDI_firm · FDI_sector)ijt
+β4QLit + β5kl + β6k + μi/j + λt + θl + χit (13)
where χit = ηit + ψit. That is, with labor productivity as the dependent variable we must add the
capital-labor ratio as well as capital by itself.
Similarly, we can derive an expression for wages paid. Assuming that workers earn their marginal
product, we obtain an expression for (log) wages per worker by taking the partial derivative of (1)
with respect to L, divide by L, take natural logs and substitute for TFP to obtain
wpwit = δ0 + δ1FDI_firmit + δ2FDI_sector jt + δ3 (FDI_firm · FDI_sector)ijt
+δ4QLit + δ5kl + δ6k + μi/j + λt + θl + τ it (14)
where wpw is (the natural log of) wages per worker, δ5 = (2− α2), δ6 = (α1 + α2 − 2) and τ it is
again an iid error term. As discussed earlier, much of the literature finds that while foreign firms
6Equivalently, log output or value added can be regressed on the measures of foreign presence as well as a vector
of inputs, as in Aitken and Harrison (1999). Note that an advantage of the TFP procedure used above is that the
input elasticity parameters are not constrained to be the same across industries.
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pay higher wages, the eﬀect on domestic firms may be negative or insignificant at best. We can
check whether this is the case for Ghana as well.
6 Results
In this section, we report the results from relating foreign presence at the firm and sector levels to
total factor productivity (TFP), labor productivity and wages, as outlined in the previous section.
Before discussing these, Table 1 gives the definitions of all variables and Table 2 provides summary
statistics for the variables in all the samples used in subsequent regressions. Throughout, they
illustrate that foreign firms are larger and have more capital. They also pay higher wages, although
the unconditional means for the quality of labor are also larger. Finally, they are characterized
by higher TFP as well as labor productivity. The sample sizes diﬀer slightly since all complete
observations are used in each case. We now turn to the regressions results.
Tables 3-5 present results with TFP as the dependent variable. Table 3 shows results from
estimating various versions of the basic TFP model (9), whereas Table 4 looks at level versus
growth eﬀects, as outlined in (11). Table 5 re-estimates the TFP models for domestically owned
firms only. Throughout, we confine the sample to firms for which we have at least four (out of
a possible seven) observations. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the first-stage regression results
of estimating TFP according to the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. The results seem
reasonable (although note that all but the wood products sector do not appear to be characterized
by constant returns to scale) and are roughly comparable to Görg and Strobl’s (2005) first-stage
results using a simpler methodology.
We present the results of various versions of (9) in order to ascertain whether the inclusion of
labor quality and location dummies as well as the choice between industry and firm fixed eﬀects
aﬀects the results. The sample is limited to observations for which we have complete information
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on all variables. 20 percent of firms have some amount of foreign ownership. Foreign ownership by
itself (FDI_firm) either has no (in half of the regressions) or a negative eﬀect on firm TFP. It is not
significant when we omit both labor quality and location dummies (column (1)) as well as when
we include firm instead of industry fixed eﬀects. In the latter case, the paucity of time variation
in the ownership variable makes it impossible to identify a foreign ownership eﬀect when we have
already accounted for unobservable, but time invariant heterogeneity at the firm level.
Foreign presence at the sector level (FDI_sector), on the other hand, has a statistically signifi-
cant negative eﬀect on firm TFP in all specifications. However, the interaction term is significantly
positive regardless of specification as well. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients, which is very similar
across specifications, implies that all domestic firms are negatively aﬀected by foreign presence in
a sector (FDI_firm=0). Foreign firms with a foreign ownership share of at least 43 percent (spec-
ification (6); less for the other ones) are estimated to benefit from the presence of other foreign
firms in their sector. All but six firms in the sample, comprising 18.5 percent of foreign firms, pass
that threshold. Thus, for most foreign owned firms, foreign presence in the sector is productivity
enhancing. But even if we take the negative coeﬃcient on firm level foreign ownership at face value,
the positive interaction term suggests that this is only true in sectors with a low foreign presence.
In sectors with a high foreign presence, foreign equity in a firm is always productivity enhancing.
Specifically, taking the results from model (4), when the foreign ownership share in a sector exceeds
34 percent, all foreign firms benefit. This is true, for example, for all years in the food products
and machinery sectors.
Which specification is the most appropriate? Not surprisingly, the R2 improves when including
firm fixed eﬀects, but also when including labor quality, which is always highly statistically signifi-
cant and positive, as expected. A Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables, however, gives slightly
conflicting results with respect to the inclusion of location dummies. When adding these for the
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specification without labor quality (regressions (2) with industry and (6) with firm fixed eﬀects),
the null of no omitted variables can no longer be rejected. This is not true in regression (4), when
labor quality is included. We caution, however, that this test is known to have low power. Thus,
in later results (Tables 5-8), we will include both location dummies and labor quality.7
We now turn to Table 4, which shows results for the modified model (11) in order to check level
and growth eﬀects of foreign presence in a sector. The sample is identical to the one in Table 3.
Recall that the coeﬃcient on the foreign presence in a sector (FDI_sector) reflects the eﬀect on
the level of TFP, while the interaction with the time trend reflects the growth eﬀect. The results
are robust, but discouraging. There is a strong negative level eﬀect, but the interaction term is
never statistically significant, suggesting that there is no oﬀsetting positive growth eﬀect on TFP
from foreign ownership. This is in stark contrast to Liu’s (2008) finding for China, where the
negative level eﬀect was predicted to be oﬀset by the positive growth eﬀect within a few years. We
cannot find such a result for Ghana.8 While this is unfortunate, it underscores the importance of
investigating diﬀerent countries and not extrapolating findings from one country to others, even if
they are similar in terms of their development level.
One stark diﬀerence to the findings in Table 3 is the positive coeﬃcient on the foreign owner-
ship variable, suggesting that all firms with any foreign ownership benefit from it. However, the
coeﬃcient again turns insignificant when including firm dummies (and the RESET test strongly
suggests that this is the appropriate specification). It is also far smaller when labor quality is
included, suggesting that foreign presence and labor quality may be correlated and thus the foreign
ownership eﬀect really reflects the higher average labor quality found in foreign-owned firms.
Table 5 presents results from running the two models on a sample of domestic firms only. As
7Aitken and Harrison (1999) also investigate whether spillovers may be local. They are able to distinguish 220
separate locations. Our data only distinguish four locations and most of the firms are located in Accra. This precludes
an investigation of local spillovers similar to Aitken and Harrison’s (1999).
8Our result is more in line with the findings of Haddad and Harrison (1993), who found no eﬀect of sector FDI
on TFP growth.
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mentioned above, from here onwards, we only present results from regressions that include both
labor quality and location dummies. The results confirm what we found in the mixed (domestic
and foreign firms) sample. Domestic firms are negatively aﬀected by the presence of foreign firms
in a sector, where a one percentage point higher sector ownership share reduces TFP by roughly
two percent, by no means a negligible eﬀect. Again, no growth eﬀect to counteract the negative
level eﬀect can be ascertained. The result of negative sectoral spillover eﬀects for domestic firms
is in line with, for example, Aitken and Harrison (1999), whose basic specification, however, more
closely resembles equation (13), estimated below. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004), in contrast, finds
no evidence of an intra-industry spillover eﬀect, positive or negative, for Lithuania, using the Olley
and Pakes (1996) methodology. This underscores again the uniqueness of a particular country
experience and sample and thus the need for additional evidence.
Tables 6 and 7 present results from repeating the exercise with value added per worker as our
measure of productivity. As shown in the previous section in equation (13), such a model can also
be derived from the production function, but requires the addition of the capital-labor ratio and,
in the absence of imposing constant returns to scale, the capital stock in the regressions. Table 6
results illustrate that the basic insights from the TFP regressions continue to hold. Foreign presence
in a sector has a negative eﬀect on all domestic and a positive eﬀect on most foreign-owned firms,
at least those with a majority foreign ownership, both in the entire (columns (1) and (3)) as well as
the domestic firms only (columns (2) and (4)) sample. In slight contrast to the TFP results, foreign
ownership alone has no significant eﬀect. We also note that the coeﬃcients on capital per worker
and the capital stock are highly significant and sensible, implying a coeﬃcient on the capital stock
of about 0.2 and on labor of about 0.35.
The results in Table 7, which investigate the level versus growth eﬀects of foreign presence, are
slightly more encouraging than those for TFP. While the level eﬀect remains strongly negative,
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three of the four specifications show a positive growth eﬀect, a significantly positive coeﬃcient on
the interaction of FDI_sector and the time trend. Still, even if we take this result at face value,
the magnitude of the coeﬃcients suggests that it would take in excess of ten years for the growth
eﬀect to compensate for the level eﬀect (for example in column (1), it would take 2.124/0.206 =
10.3 years to catch up). Thus we can conclude that the foreign presence in Ghana has been a boon
for most foreign-owned firms, but not for domestic firms. Moreover, a dynamic growth eﬀect is
unlikely to counteract the estimated negative level eﬀect. We do caution that our sample from the
1990s spans only seven years. Nonetheless, these results are somewhat discouraging.
The findings with respect to wages are similarly mixed. In Table 8, we present results from
estimating the eﬀect of foreign ownership and foreign sector presence on workers’ wages, according
to (14). The dependent variable in all regressions is the (log of) real annual wages per worker. None
of the foreign ownership and sector presence variables nor their interactions have any coeﬃcients
that are significantly diﬀerent from zero. This suggests that foreign firms have had no negative
eﬀect on wages paid in domestic firms. However, it also suggests that in Ghana, at least in the
firms in our sample, foreign firms do not pay higher wages than domestic firms, once we control for
labor quality. The latter is an important point. Were we not to control for labor quality, we would
find the standard result that foreign firms do pay higher wages. We emphasize that we think that
the labor quality measure that we use is a very good one because it considers both education and
experience and it is based on individual level information from the firms in the sample. This is a
measure that is not available in most samples others have used and thus we worry that the finding
elsewhere that foreign firms do pay higher wages may be due to an inadequate measure of worker
characteristics in foreign versus domestic firms. However, we will have to leave a more thorough
investigation of this possibility for future work.
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7 Conclusion
The experience of developing countries with foreign direct investment in their economies is extremely
varied. Existing studies of the eﬀects of FDI on productivity and wages find everything from positive
eﬀects on foreign as well as domestic firms, inter- and intra-industry spillovers to no aggregate
industry or economy-wide eﬀects to strongly negative eﬀects, particularly for productivity and
wages of competing domestic firms. These diﬀerences in country experiences may in part reflect to
what extent channels through which superior foreign technology and practices spill over to domestic
firms exist. Regardless, they underscore that it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to extrapolate from
one country’s experience to others.
This is particularly true for sub-Saharan African countries, whose characteristics as well as
trade and investment policies are quite distinct from many Asian and Latin American developing
countries. Thus, evidence on the eﬃcacy of foreign investment for this particular set of countries is
important in order to inform the discussion of the welfare eﬀects of FDI and future policies. At the
same time, the most convincing evidence results from firm-level studies with several years of data.
Self-selection and unobserved heterogeneity loom large in productivity analyses and can only be
overcome with such microdata. Thus, country case studies that use a consistent and representative
sample such as the one used in this study of Ghana are the most likely to help improve our
understanding of the heterogeneous eﬀects of foreign investment across industries, countries, and
continents.
We find that controlling for observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity along a number of
dimensions, the presence of foreign firms in a sector has a negative eﬀect on the productivity of
domestically owned, but a positive eﬀect on most foreign owned firms. Decomposing the eﬀect into
level and growth eﬀects, we find that the former is negative, but the latter does not appear to be
positive in the case of total factor productivity. There is some evidence that there is a positive
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growth eﬀect with respect to labor productivity, but the magnitude of the estimates suggest that
the catching-up process is likely to take at least a decade. This result is in contrast to other recent
ones, for example for China, underscoring that the experience of SSA countries is quite diﬀerent.
The results with respect to wages are similarly mixed and at least in part at odds with the
existing literature. While foreign presence in a sector does not appear to aﬀect wages negatively,
foreign-owned firms also do not appear to pay higher wages themselves, once we control for labor
quality within the firm. Of course, it is conceivable that the higher labor quality and the corre-
sponding higher wages for skilled workers (see also Teal, 2000) are a result of worker training in
those foreign firms. An investigation of this possibility is, however, left for future work. It is also
hoped that more detailed firm level data for other countries in SSA can be analyzed along the lines
of this study in order to ascertain the benefits FDI may bring to the region.
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Table 1: List of Variables and Their Definitions
Variable Description
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
methodology with labor (measured as real wages paid),
the total value of capital at replacement value and the
real value of all materials as inputs and real value added
as output, all in ‘000s of Cedis. Firm-specific input and
output deflators provided y the Centre for the Study of
African Economies at the University of Oxford were used.
See the text for details and Table A1 for the first stage
TFP regression results by sector.
Labor Productivity Real value added in ‘000s of Cedis per worker.
FDI_firm A firm’s foreign equity share, taken directly from the sur-
vey.
FDI_sector Share of foreign equity in a sector, weighted by firm real
output. For a listing of sectors, see below.
Labor Quality Sum of the firm level weighted average of education and
tenure for each employee, multiplied by the number of
employees.
Time A time trend.
Industry Dummies A dummy for each of the following industrial sectors:
Bakeries, Furniture, Garments, Textiles, Metals, Machin-
ery, Wood Products. The omitted sector is Food Process-
ing.
Regional Dummies A dummy for each of the following regions: Accra, Ku-
masi, Takoradi. The omitted region is Cape Coast.
Firm Dummies A dummy for each firm included in the respective sample.
Year dummies A dummy for each of the years covered in the sample
(1991-1997). The omitted year is 1991.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics Various Subsamples
Total Factor Productivity Sample All Firms (912 Observations)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Value Added 105,018 10,364 339,821 6 4,259,198
Labor 22,559 2,878 58,590 6 538,645
Capital 541,712 14,929 3,365,132 20 7.99E07
Materials 114,351 14,224 444,698 0 7,983,212
TFP 426.5 131.0 869.4 0.056 10,744
FDI_firm 0.116 0 0.257 0 1
FDI_sector 0.284 0.342 0.171 0 0.580
FDI_firm · FDI_sector 0.044 0 0.103 0 0.580
FDI_sector · Time Trend 1.222 1.069 1.027 0 3.928
Labor Quality 1,050 278.7 1,968 1 13,557
Total Factor Productivity Sample Domestic Firms (738 Observations)
Value Added 37,293 6,920 89,298 6 1,027,462
Labor 9,837 1,634 25,032 6 308,919
Capital 173,255 5,949 635,691 20 1.08E07
Materials 42,693 9,452 116,351 0 1,384,413
TFP 314.8 122.3 585.0 0.056 7,917
FDI_sector 0.261 0.283 0.174 0 0.580
FDI_sector · Time Trend 1.108 1.027 1.001 0 3.928
Labor Quality 609.9 203.4 1,116 1 10,677
Labor Productivity Sample All Firms (1006 Observations)
Labor Productivity 1,015 550.4 1,592 0.257 23,877
FDI_firm 0.105 0 0.247 0 1
FDI_sector 0.240 0.309 0.174 0 0.561
FDI_firm · FDI_sector 0.037 0 0.094 0 0.561
FDI_sector · Time Trend 1.005 0.620 0.997 0 3.927
Labor Quality 990.4 240.9 1,912 1 13,557
Capital per Worker 4,110 607.5 16,060 1.874 358,139
Capital 502,331 10,980 3,210,683 20 7.99E07
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Table 2, continued: Summary Statistics Various Subsamples
Labor Productivity Sample Domestic Firms (832 Observations)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Labor Productivity 794.2 457.9 1,021 0.257 8,497
FDI_sector 0.217 0.171 0.173 0 0.561
FDI_sector · Time Trend 0.891 0.606 0.953 0 3.927
Labor Quality 587.7 185.5 1,114 1 10,677
Capital per Worker 2,689 352.4 7,120 1.874 109,556
Capital 167,267 4,048 626,991 20 1.08E07
Wages Sample All Firms (948 Observations)
Wages per Worker 223.1 159.2 234.4 0.75 2,682
FDI_firm 0.112 0 0.253 0 1
FDI_sector 0.264 0.283 0.169 0 0.580
FDI_firm · FDI_sector 0.041 0 0.098 0 0.580
FDI_sector · Time Trend 1.125 1.025 0.973 0 3.405
Labor Quality 1,059 269.7 2,030 1 16,984
Capital per Worker 4,390 813.7 16,540 4.436 358,139
Capital 535,569 14,333 3,306,976 20 7.99E07
Wages Sample Domestic Firms (772 Observations)
Wages per Worker 176.4 120.5 0.171 0.75 1,178
FDI_sector 0.240 0.267 0.940 0 0.580
FDI_sector · Time Trend 1.011 0.774 0.940 0 3.405
Labor Quality 623.8 200.0 1,250 1 16,984
Capital per Worker 2,905 419.7 7,429 4.436 109,556
Capital 175,892 5,705 648,240 20 1.08E07
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Table 3: Foreign Ownership and Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI_firm -0.743 -0.960** -1.929*** -1.905*** -1.518 0.509
(0.456) (0.458) (0.378) (0.380) (3.549) (3.642)
FDI_sector -1.552*** -1.596*** -1.830*** -1.864*** -1.584*** -1.656***
(0.587) (0.589) (0.603) (0.607) (0.499) (0.505)
FDI_firm · FDI_sector 4.476*** 4.813*** 5.722*** 5.677*** 3.948*** 3.887***
(1.193) (1.188) (1.001) (1.005) (1.452) (1.481)
Labor Quality 0.440*** 0.440*** 0.246***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.075)
Industry Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm Dummies? No No No No Yes Yes
Location Dummies? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of
foreign firms 32 32 32 32 32 32
Number of
domestic firms 128 128 128 128 128 128
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912
R2 0.67 0.68 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.86
F(·) 112.0 106.6 131.5 127.4 162.3 140.0
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RESET F(·) 4.01 0.50 9.52 10.22 2.66 1.84
Prob. > F 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.14
Notes:
Dependent variable is the natural log of total factor productivity (TFP).
All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
**, *** denote significance at the five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 4: Foreign Ownership and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Level and Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI_firm 0.943*** 0.860*** 0.231* 0.244* 0.306 2.283
(0.186) (0.189) (0.138) (0.139) (4.037) (4.113)
FDI_sector -1.690** -1.644** -1.518** -1.522** -1.861*** -1.697***
(0.748) (0.742) (0.732) (0.731) (0.596) (0.598)
FDI_sector · Time 0.146 0.133 0.085 0.076 0.147 0.095
(0.121) (0.121) (0.107) (0.107) (0.091) (0.092)
Time -0.033 -0.027 -0.017 -0.013 -0.042 -0.025
(0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031)
Labor Quality 0.433*** 0.435*** 0.243***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.080)
Industry Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm Dummies? No No No No Yes Yes
Location Dummies? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of
foreign firms 32 32 32 32 32 32
Number of
domestic firms 128 128 128 128 128 128
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912
R2 0.66 0.66 0.74 0.74 0.85 0.86
F(·) 147.3 128.8 173.3 154.2 120.7 113.1
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RESET F(·) 4.00 0.85 16.21 15.78 0.33 0.04
Prob. > F 0.01 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.99
Notes:
Dependent variable is the natural log of total factor productivity (TFP).
All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: Foreign Ownership and Total Factor Productivity (TFP): Domestic Firms Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI_sector -1.699*** -1.537*** -2.015** -1.776***
(0.659) (0.524) (0.795) (0.647)
FDI_sector · Time 0.098 0.076
(0.112) (0.100)
Time -0.010 -0.013
(0.036) (0.033)
Labor Quality 0.368*** 0.270*** 0.367*** 0.260***
(0.033) (0.081) (0.033) (0.088)
Industry Dummies? Yes No Yes No
Firm Dummies? No Yes No Yes
Location Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
domestic firms 128 128 128 128
Observations 738 738 738 738
R2 0.72 0.83 0.71 0.82
F(·) 84.70 50.75 101.4 69.42
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RESET F(·) 10.55 1.96 12.68 0.53
Prob. > F 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.66
Notes:
Dependent variable is the natural log of total factor productivity (TFP).
All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
**, *** denote significance at the five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 6: Foreign Ownership and Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI_firm -0.378 -2.159
(0.308) (3.555)
FDI_sector -1.220** -1.108** -1.861*** -1.689***
(0.500) (0.553) (0.452) (0.467)
FDI_firm · FDI_sector 2.569*** 3.833***
(0.868) (1.295)
Labor Quality 0.459*** 0.412*** 0.287** 0.304**
(0.125) (0.126) (0.142) (0.145)
Capital per Worker 0.638*** 0.637*** 0.735*** 0.729***
(0.132) (0.136) (0.166) (0.175)
Capital -0.432*** -0.427*** -0.704*** -0.742***
(0.132) (0.138) (0.166) (0.175)
Industry Dummies? Yes Yes No No
Firm Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Location Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
foreign firms 32 - 32 -
Number of
domestic firms 145 145 145 145
Observations 1006 832 1006 832
R2 0.43 0.39 0.72 0.69
F(·) 30.31 24.44 31.76 26.63
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RESET F(·) 9.23 10.81 4.80 4.83
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
Dependent variable is the natural log of value added per worker.
All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
**, *** denote significance at the five, and one percent level, respectively.
31
Table 7: Foreign Ownership and Labor Productivity Level and Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI_firm 0.503*** -0.044
(0.152) (3.948)
FDI_sector -2.124*** -2.280*** -2.854*** -2.819***
(0.781) (0.854) (0.666) (0.727)
FDI_sector · Time 0.206* 0.208 0.233** 0.189*
(0.123) (0.131) (0.103) (0.113)
Time -0.059 -0.052 -0.072** -0.059*
(0.039) (0.040) (0.033) (0.035)
Labor Quality 0.404*** 0.356*** 0.199 0.225
(0.124) (0.126) (0.147) (0.153)
Capital per Worker 0.579*** 0.588*** 0.628*** 0.633***
(0.131) (0.136) (0.169) (0.182)
Capital -0.371*** -0.368*** -0.555*** -0.595***
(0.133) (0.137) (0.169) (0.181)
Industry Dummies? Yes Yes No No
Firm Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Location Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
foreign firms 32 - 32 -
Number of
domestic firms 145 145 145 145
Observations 1006 832 1006 832
R2 0.42 0.38 0.70 0.67
F(·) 37.27 29.21 53.16 46.47
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RESET F(·) 7.44 10.42 1.95 1.80
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.15
Notes:
Dependent variable is the natural log of value added per worker.
All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 8: Foreign Ownership and Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI_firm 0.360 -1.286
(0.388) (1.423)
FDI_sector 0.225 0.152 -0.286 -0.306
(0.371) (0.398) (0.329) (0.331)
FDI_firm · FDI_sector 0.107 2.014
(0.878) (1.477)
Labor Quality 0.422*** 0.341*** 0.169** 0.158*
(0.101) (0.098) (0.086) (0.084)
Capital per Worker 0.477*** 0.413*** 0.518*** 0.531***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.116) (0.123)
Capital -0.318*** -0.258** -0.510*** -0.540***
(0.109) (0.108) (0.118) (0.125)
Industry Dummies? Yes Yes No No
Firm Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Location Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
foreign firms 32 - 32 -
Number of
domestic firms 130 130 130 130
Observations 948 772 948 772
R2 0.43 0.35 0.72 0.68
F(·) 38.10 23.95 37.22 33.04
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RESET F(·) 2.76 6.90 1.18 0.64
Prob. > F 0.04 0.00 0.32 0.59
Notes:
Dependent variable is the natural log of wages per worker.
All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
**, *** denote significance at the five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Appendix
Table A1: TFP Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food Bakeries Furniture Garments & Metals & Wood
processing Textiles machinery products
Capital 0.125 -0.056 0.320*** 0.124 0.040 0.269
(0.119) (0.199) (0.094) (0.144) (0.067) (0.206)
Labor 0.375*** 0.474*** 0.234*** 0.487*** 0.398*** 0.643***
(0.110) (0.117) (0.075) (0.103) (0.081) (0.220)
Observations 126 96 206 146 254 84
Number of firms 21 16 35 28 42 18
Constant Returns? No No No No No Yes
Notes:
Results from first-stage regressions using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.
See text for details.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Constant Returns = Yes if a Wald test for constant returns cannot reject H0 (Constant Returns)
at least at the five percent level.
*** denotes significance at the one percent level.
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